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Abstract 
 
Purpose –This article deals with the relationship existing between the emotional aspect and 
decision-making processes. More specifically, it examines the links between emotional intelligence, 
decision biases and effectiveness of the governance mechanisms. The primary purposes of this article are 
to: consider emotional intelligence like new research ideas that make important contributions to society; 
offer suggestions for improving manuscripts submitted to Consortium for Research on Emotional 
Intelligence in Organizations; and discuss methods for enhancing the validity of inferences made from 
research. 
Design/methodology/approach – The article explain that the main cause of organization’s problems is 
CEO emotional intelligence level.  I will use three models (linear regression and logistic binary regression 
) to examine this relation: every model treats the relationship between emotional intelligence and one of 
efficiency criteria of the board. Emotional intelligence has been measured according to the scale of Schutte 
and al (Shutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence Scale, SSREI, Shuttle and al. 1998) with a high internal 
validity level. Regarding, The four cognitive biases they have been measured by means of a questionnaire 
comprising several items. As for the selected sample, it has been composed of some180 Bangladeshi  
executives (belonging to 60 firms). 
Findings – Our results have revealed that the presence of a high emotional intelligence rate is not always 
positively correlated with the executives’ suggestibility with respect to behavioural biases. They have also 
affirmed the existence of a complementarily relationship between emotional intelligence and the directors’ 
board. Authors need to consider that emotional witch permit to minimize CEO emotional biases and 
provide director’s board effectiveness. 
Research limitations/implications – This article has implications for the development of   CEO 
emotional intelligence capacity. Besides, some psychological aspects of theoretical nature could not be 
wholly approached in a complete empirical way.  
Practical implications – The article push organization to select managers based on their levels of 
intelligence emotional (apply tests of emotional intelligence in place psychometric tests). Also, it increase 
the validity of inferences made from research in the field. 
Social implications– This article incite governments to establish a training programs witch aimed the  
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development of learning of emotional intelligence. Thus, it has important implications for enhancing the 
well being of individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. 
Originality/value – Actually, for the sake improving the explanatory power of legal-financial approach of 
governance, the behavioural dimension has been integrated for a more thorough analysis of the directors’ 
board role. Our goal consists in highlighting the role played by emotional intelligence as a skill or tool 
available for the manager or controller to minimize the behavioural biases (bias of loss aversion, optimism, 
over-confidence and lack of cognitive flexibility), and achieves an effective control. 
Keywords: emotional intelligence; cognitive bias; corporate governance; board of directors. 
 
Introduction 
The governance theories have evolved substantially, undressing a shift from create modelling, primarily 
based on the financial model, into more complex and, presumably, more realistic and pragmatic models 
involving the whole set of stakeholders, playing a great deal of importance on the productive capacity 
aspect as much as on the allocation aspect Jensen and Meckling (1976),  Shleifer and Vishny (1997),  
Zingales (1998), Rajan and  Zingales (1998) Blair and Stout  (1999), Laporta and al (2000), …etc. 
 
This development, guided and inspired by the evolution in firm related theories have made of the human 
capital and the human resources management the focal point of the governance concerns. Indeed, the value 
creation process has been the major subject matter of the corporate governance theories. Each approach 
(whether cognitive or disciplinary) has initiated a process phase in order to reduce the conflicts of interests, 
problems of wealth/profit distribution and cognitive conflicts. Despite these approaches contribution in 
matters of governance, diverse aspects of the governance system have still remained misunderstood or not 
even perceived, hence the need to integrate the behavioural dimension within the governance approaches. 
In this respect, sheffrin (2001) has stated that the introduction of a behavioural dimension leads to an 
approximation of finance and governance convergence with the other management sciences, which may 
help mutual complementary overlapping and intermingling. 
 
Noteworthy, our idea has been inspired by the behavioural approach and aims at highlighting the emotional 
intelligence role in minimizing the behavioural biases and improving governance mechanisms efficiency 
including the directors’ board. Certain literary works and elements pertaining to emotional intelligence and 
work performance likely provide and supply us with relevant clues and hints to support and sustain our 
intuition and line of work serve as a basis background for our research. 
 1. Literature Review and Hypothesis  
The analysis elaborated by Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Zahra and Pearce (1989), Yermack 
(1996), Eisenberg and al (1998) Cui and Mak (2002), Carapeto and al (2005), Adams and al (2009) … etc 
has shows that the Board of Directors is characterized by several closely-related attributes. Among these 
attributes, one can distinguish board’s composition with respect its size, to the subdivision into internal and 
external managers and to the representation of the concerned relevant parties or "stakeholders" among are, 
European Journal of Business and Management     www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol 4, No.5, 2012 
 
 
58 
namely, the employees, the creditors, the institutional bodies, the customers, the suppliers…etc. 
 
In addition to presenting the governance mechanism attributes, the contractual theories have dealt with 
initiated the notion of this board’s efficiency: the agency theory has demonstrated that tackled the council 
effectiveness is conditional upon the controller’s skill and motivation. The theory of the leaders’ 
implantation represents a third condition namely the independence with regards to the leader Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Denis and McConnell (2003), Gillan (2006), Bulan and al (2009),……etc. Hence, in this 
section, the central objective consists in highlighting the type of relationship existing between emotional 
intelligence and the Board of director’s efficiency. 
 
1.1.  Loss aversion, emotional intelligence and director’s board efficiency 
The available literature enables to affirm that emotional intelligence plays a crucial role in the subordinates’ 
perception of the leader’s efficiency (George, 2000). More exactly, most of concerned studies have shown 
that a well emotionally intelligent leader having a higher emotional intelligence is an effective one. 
 
This achieved result, pertaining to the field of management, affirms the observation of Greenfield (2002) 
regarding the difficulty met by the internal administrators. Blair and al (2000), postulate that these 
administrators cannot behave against the interests of their leader or their superiors. The inability to oppose 
the leader’s taken decisions can be explained by the awareness of his "internal" controllers regarding these 
decisions’ efficiency. Although emotional intelligence has reduced the aversion loss in the controller’s 
perception and mind as well in the manager’s suggestable decisions regarding this type of bias, it appears to 
be a hindrance to the director’s board effectiveness as a controlling organ. In their proposed model, Mayer 
and Salovey (1997) have estimated that emotional intelligence plays an important role not only in 
regulating and controlling emotions but also in developing intellectual and cognitive processes (Lopes and 
al , 2005; Song and al, 2010). The absence of this skill implies an uncertainty, which, according to 
Anderson (1983) , may lead to aversion complaining the individual, “the controller”, to apply a 
conservative trend and refuse any decision (Trautmann and al, 2009; Vieider, 2009) likely to alter his 
current status ( improving of his role as he is forced to oppose any decision taken by the managing team). 
However, an emotionally wise intelligent controller, eager to reduce his losses has to take mediating stand 
to arbitrate between the acquired advantages by his participation in director’s boards and the efficiency of 
his control. Hence, he is likely lose a lot by opposing the leaders’ decisions (Petrides and al, 2007; Siu, 
2009) 
It can be notice, that emotional intelligence, as being the controller’s exclusive individual capacity, would 
enable him to minimize the sensation of aversion risk and ensure the control efficiency. By contrast, 
according to the implanting theory this vision is erroneous. Indeed, agents can enjoy particular skills (such 
as emotional intelligence) to acquire and interpret information about the company, its environment and its 
actors (essentially the leader). However, a great deal of information can never be handled and remains at 
the leader’s exclusive disposal. In this case, emotional intelligence would reduce the controller’s 
uncertainty as regards the quality of information being at his disposal. It can be considered as a skill 
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competence which may facilitate the leader’s implantion and reassesses the efficiency of control exerted by 
the administrators. In this respect the following hypothesis seem worth proposing: 
 
H1: the more the aversion loss decreases (high level of emotional intelligence), the more the board’s 
control would be effective. 
 
1.2.  Optimism, emotional intelligence and the director’s board efficiency  
The probability that optimism may prevail and wine over of the administrators has challenged the director’s 
board disciplinary power and put it into question (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Thus, optimism the firm 
partners’ optimism implies an unlimited discretionally space for the leader and, causes disparities in the 
distribution of created value there of. 
 
Gervais and al (2003) have even show that the leaders’ delivered stock-options, aimed reducing the agency 
problems, would encourage them to take even greater risks which contradicts the shareholders’ interests. As 
an illustration, on facing an acquisition plan, and owing to his there optimism, the leader can overestimate 
the synergies along with the target (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Campbell and al, 2011).  This error of 
valuation will not necessarily be corrected by the board of directors or by the investors who are themselves 
victims of a bias of optimism (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 
Bhagat and Black (2000) have stressed the role of the wage-earning managers in minimizing the optimism 
bias and there of improving, of the functioning of the governance mechanisms, namely including the board 
of directors. Another possible resolution likely to minimize optimism bias in the development of emotional 
competences including emotional intelligence. The latter in fact, transmits an individual capacity to manage 
his proper emotions as well as the others’ (Côté and al, 2006; Côté and al, 2010), and particularly to apply 
them in a way that reinforces the effectiveness of cognitive processes, (Goleman, 2001). In other words, 
emotional intelligence allows every individual, (whether leader, manager or controller) to be aware of his 
firm’s strengths, and weaknesses as well as the competence of the leading team competences which is likely 
to reduce the degree of his optimism. Zeidner and al (2004) have shown the positive role that emotional 
intelligence could play in reducing the amount of optimism bias among executives. Therefore, one might 
well notice that according to these studies, there exists a positive Impact of emotional intelligence on 
improving the directors’ board functioning. Hence, the following hypothesis appears worth stating: 
 
H2: the more optimism diminishes, the more the control exerted by the director’s board is 
efficient.                                                                            
 
1.3. Overconfidence, emotional intelligence and the director’s board efficiency. 
Ben-David and al (2006) have postulated that an extreme appeal to confidence mechanisms is likely to 
result in the loss of effectiveness. In fact, being over-confident of his capacities and personal competences, 
the leader will be encouraged to undertake a rooting policy and manipulate information in such a way as to 
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preserve his investment in a certain specific capital (Lo and al, 2007). This information manipulation 
hinders the functioning of the governance mechanisms including that of the board of directors. 
 
By means of illustration, confidence excess would certainly encourage the leader to overestimate his proper 
projects, (Baker and al 2004). Moreover, and according to (Duhaime and Schwenk, 1983), the leader tends 
to believe that he has a control over the investment plans or over other elements on which he has no impact. 
Still, some analyses consider that this bias can have some advantageous effects. Le Blanc and Rachlinski 
(2005) have noticed that, by increasing the number of transactions, the over-confidence bias among 
investors may lead to a better revelation of information along with higher market liquidity. In tow, Elster 
(1998) has postulated that emotions can correct the indeterminations resulting by indecisions of the 
calculation reasoning. In other words, emotions, particularly emotional intelligence, tend to guide the 
individual towards rationality relevant (Mayer and al, 2008). Data dominantly suggested that individuals 
with endowed with a high level of emotional intelligence would be more aware of the influencing factors 
affecting their positive and negative emotions (Rode and al, 2007; Karim, 2010). Actually awareness and 
understanding of these emotion-triggering factors would allow the managers to select the moor appropriate 
actions and improve the directors’ board effectiveness as a governance mechanism. As for Damasio (1994), 
emotional intelligence improves the decisions quality as well as the ability adaptation by allowing the 
harmonization of the different cognitive processes. It is even regarded by some writers as an essentially 
crucial motor of organizational performance (Goleman and al, 2001) 
 
As a matter of fact, emotional intelligence allows every individual to develop an emotional consciousness 
whirly to react to different situations. It would help the manager to better recognize himself (by reducing 
over-confidence) and maintain safeguard his motivation to achieve his projects. It is, therefore, important to 
evaluate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: the more the confidence excess decreases, the more the directors’ board control is effective. 
 
1.4. Cognitive flexibility, emotional intelligence and the directors’ board efficiency  
Recently elaborated reflections and thoughts pretending to the administrators’ role as set up by Jensen and 
Fuller (2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) have recommended a  drastic reform of the managers’ role in 
such a way that they can guarantee on the one hand the fairness honesty and integrity of all the organization 
members, and, on other hand, honesty play an intermediary role between the leaders and the financial 
markets so that the latter would better understand the possible outcomes impacts and consequences of the 
strategic choices and alternatives or  the company’s value. The managers would, then, under the 
responsibility of guiding the leaders’ decisions. This new role actually requires a cognitive flexibility and an 
ability of adaptation to changes. This adaptation capacity necessitates a high level of emotional intelligence. 
Indeed, Huy (2002) has shown that only a double condition can radical changes be implemented,  namely: 
1-The projects of change arouse an emotional support among a certain number of managers.2-The 
managers are aware of listening to, of their subordinates’ emotional feeling and response. Hence, an 
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emotionally intelligent administrator is capable of having a wide and opened field of vision, a synthetic 
view large enough to globally understand a certain situation (Mayer and al, 2008). This would, in effect, 
improve the evaluation of the leaders’ performance and ensure control efficiency. 
 
In this respect, Sentis (2001) has demonstrated that managers having a discretionary margin would seek 
tools (including the re-evaluation of assets) enabling them to give a good image for their firms, thus 
increasing their pay and ensuring the stability their jobs stability. Consequently the leader's cognitive 
flexibility is negatively correlated with the directors’ board efficiency target. For these reasons, the aim of 
appointing outside directors lies in providing the board with certain skills (cognitive flexibility due to a 
high emotional intelligence), and an objective judgement to build a supervisory element and to make sure 
that the leaders’ performance meets the usual standards (Pathan and Skully, 2010). This role can not by any 
means be assumed by executive directors too involved in management. Actually, the outside directors moor 
often bring a fresh and an impartial point of view since they would thoroughly examine the problems and 
from an external perspective. In addition, they provide specific answers to certain questions and then may 
be sources of contact. Indeed several studies have pointed out that it is economically advantageous to hire 
people in respect their emotional intelligence (Gendron, 2005). The positive impact of emotional 
intelligence on improving cognitive flexibility and the adaptation ability to shifts of administrators have led 
us to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: the higher cognitive flexibility is high (high level of emotional intelligence), the more effective is the 
executive’s control by the board of directors. 
2. Methodology   
This section is divided into two subsections, the first of which is denoted to discuss the data source, and 
sample formation, while section 2 discusses our variable measurement.   
 
2.1. Data sample selection 
To note, the empirical tests are based on 60 non-financial Bangladeshi firms during the 2007 fiscal year (28 
are listed companies and 32 are non-listed companies, see table 1). All financial firms (including banks) 
outing to the fact that this business sector is regulated and likely to have fundamentally different cash flows 
and characteristics. Firms with insufficient data regarding about emotional intelligence and the board of 
director’s composition are also excluded. The board’s compositions as well as financial characteristics data 
are gathered from the BVMT annual report.  
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Table 1 
Visited Companies 
Initial BVMT sample for 2007 50 
financial firms (22) 
Other non financial  firms 80 
Insufficient data to emotionnel intelligence (40) 
Insufficient data to board of directors compositions (8) 
Final sample 60 
 
Emotional intelligence and psychological characteristics are collected by means of an administered 
questionnaire.  Actually, the selected choice deals with some homogeneous individuals representing some 
Bangladeshi  CEO Representatives of 60 firms (100 males, 75 females, 5 unreported), ranging in age from 
25 to 58 (table 2).  Most questionnaires have been distributed by the method of door to door to ensure 
they are personally delivered to the concerned person; few among them have been mailed, for businesses 
located outside the Greater Bangladeshi area.  
 
It is worth noting, however, a broader sample that even if it had been envisaged to be studied and that more 
than one hundred eighty questionnaires had been distributed for this purpose, we have would received far 
fewer responses than expected ( return rate  = 50.42%: although the number of distributed questionnaires 
reached 357, the responses received did not exceeded 180 CEO). Indeed, a Many of the adduced have 
refused to respond to our question on the ground of several reasons, namely, that: 
• They are too busy and have no time to devote to research; 
• They generally do not pay interest to the questionnaires submitted by students and would return 
them to their assistants or other staff for a response (this has been the case of our officer-centred 
research); 
• They perceive that the questionnaire is a sort of "control" damage to their private lives that it is out 
of question to answer. 
 
Other encountered difficulties are mainly due to the administrative procedures and hierarchical procedures 
which linger questionnaires to the recoveries. Fortunately, the leaders who had been kind as to cooperate 
and help us formulate and set up our sample eventually composed of 180 private company leaders 
belonging mostly to the industrial sector. 
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Table 2 
CEOs’ Characteristics  
  N Percentages 
Age 25-30 years 
31-40 years 
40-49 years 
Over 50 years 
41 
75 
39 
25 
22.77 
41.66 
21.66 
13.88 
 
 
 Gender/ Sex Males 
females 
unreported 
100 
75 
5 
55.55 
41.66 
2.77 
 
 
 
Degree Baccalaureate 
Bac+2 
Bac+4 
DAS/HDSS 
20 
35 
80 
45 
11.11 
19.44 
44.44 
25.00 
 
2.2. Variables’ measurement   
The objective of this section is to determine the variables’ measurement (endogenous and exogenous).  
 
 
 
2.2.1. Measuring the Board of directors’ characteristics and efficiency 
To note, theories regarding the board of directors, along with prior empirical researches and various 
recommendations have suggested that some board characteristics have an influence on the quality of the 
financial report and on firms’ performance. Three major board characteristics are examined here: size, 
independence and presence of CEO duality (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
2.2.1.1. Board size 
Noteworthy, the board’s effectiveness highly depends one the number of directors on its size. Relevant 
literature provides no consensus about the direct relationship between the board size and effectiveness. On 
the one hand, a larger board is less likely to operate effectively and is easier for the CEO to control (Jensen, 
1993 and Ben Khediri, 2006). On the other hand, Yermak (1996) considers that the board’s size is a factor 
among a range of variables that might influence executive compensation and company performance. 
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In this study the directors board size (BSIZE) has simply been measured by the number of its members 
(Dechow and al, 1996; Yermak, 1996; Peasnell and al, 1998; Coulton and al, 2001 and Chtourou, 2001).  
 
2.2.1.2. The board’s independence 
The different characteristics pertaining to the boards independence are measured by the following variable : 
BIND is defined as the percentage of the board members who are simultaneously independent and 
non-executives which is  equal to the number of outside directors divided by the total board members   
(Chtourou and al, 2001; Wright, 1996; Forker, 1992 ; Haniffa and Cooke, 2000 ).BIND = number of outside 
directors /total board members. 
 
2.2.1.3. CEO Duality  
Board chairs role consists in monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). The latter supposes that CEOs who also 
hold the position of board chair (Duality) exert an undue influence on the board, compromising the strength 
of the board’s governance. 
The board chairs characteristics are defined by DUAL = 1 if the CEO is also board chair and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3 presents the Characteristics of Boards of Directors of the 60 Bangladeshi companies included in our 
study. Bangladeshi companies are run by independent boards, medium (7directors) and not be dominated 
by CEOs. 
Table 3 
Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
variable Mean std Min Max N 
Entire board  7.60 2.56 4 12 60 
Outside directors  2.62 1.11 1 4 60 
Affiliated directors 1.98 0.80 1 3 60 
Inside directors 3.360 1.34 1 5 60 
CEO Duality 0.26 0.44 0 1 60 
2.2.2. The emotional intelligence measure: SSREI TEST 
In this search, we have generated a pool of 18 items Table4 (derived from schutte and al, 1998 i.e. the 
SSREI test) based on the theoretical model of emotional intelligence as developed by Salovey and Mayer 
(1990). Each item selected for the initial 18 items pool should reflected an adaptive tendency toward 
emotional intelligence within the models framework. Respondents have used a 5-point scale, on which the 
figure “1” represents “strongly disagree” and “5” represents “strongly agree,” to indicate to what extent 
each item described fits them. All parts of the model have been represented by numerous items. Each of the 
first four authors has independently evaluated each item for fidelity to the relevant construct, clarity and 
readability. Noteworthy, some items have been deleted while some others have been   added or revised 
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before pilot testing them by asking several individuals to complete the scale and note any unclear elements. 
This process has eventually resulted in a pilot-tested pool of 18 items. 
Table 4 
Applied Items in the modified 18-item emotional intelligence scale 
Items FACTOR1: 
assessing others 
emotions: 
39.976% 
 OF TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
 
FACTOR2: 
evaluating her 
personal 
emotions: 
6.265% 
OF  TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
FACTOR3:  
emotions use in 
Problems solving:  
5,610%  
OF  TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
1. I am aware and able to interpret or 
decipher of the non-verbal messages other 
people send. 
0.702 
  
2. I can tell people as feeling through t the 
tone of their voice. 
0.682   
3. I can understand others feeling by just 
looking at them. 
0.672   
4. Most of the major remarkable events of 
my life have led me to re-evaluate what is 
important and what is not. 
0.646   
5. I know when the right moment is to speak 
about my personal problems to others. 
0.622   
6. Won facing obstacles, I remember times 
when I faced similar obstacles and 
overcame them. 
0.584 0.512  
7. I am aware of my emotions as I 
experience them. 
 0.721  
8. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to 
come up with new ideas. 
 0.700  
9. When I am in a good mood, solving 
problems is easy for me. 
 0.647  
10. I use good moods and may sense of 
humor to help face an obstacles. 
 0.627  
11. I can easily recognize my emotions as I 
experience them. 
 0.516  
12. I motivate myself by expecting 
potentially positive. 
  0.656 
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13. I seek out activities that would thing to 
hopper on my life make me happy. 
  0.599 
14. I expect that I will do well on most 
things I attempts or set for. 
  0.573 
15. Emotions are listing among other things 
that make my life worth living. 
  0.573 
16. When my mood changes I for see or 
expect some new possibilities. 
  0.528 
17. When I experience a positive emotion, I 
would know how to make it last. 
  0.499 
18. I make appreciable arrangement of the 
events which others enjoy . 
  0.447 
 
2.2.3. Emotional biases measure 
The second part of our questionnaire (14 items, table 5) focuses on evaluating and scoring of the four 
emotional biases (optimism, overconfidence, risk aversion and cognitive flexibility). The questions have 
been inspired from the questionnaires formulated by the Fern Hill and Industrial Alliance companies. 
 
Table 5 
Items used in the emotional biases scale (14 items) 
 
Items  FACTOR 1 : 
loss aversion 
50.710% 
OF TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
FACTOR 2: 
optimism 
29.450% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
FACTOR 3 : 
overconfidence 
10.275% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
FACTOR 4 :  
cognitive 
flexibility 
5.385% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
1. What is your propensity to 
take financial risks with 
respect to others? 
0.802    
2. With a great financial 
decision, what do you care 
about  
more: possible losses or 
possible gains? 
0.742    
3. Insurance can protect us 
against a wide variety of risks:  
theft, fire, accidents, illness 
and death ... How many  
0.713    
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insurance subscriptions have 
you subscribed ho? 
4. When you think of the 
word "risk" in a financial 
context, what 
term in the following list first 
comes to mind? 
0.686    
5. When I'm faced with a 
challenge, I give up because 
I'm afraid of failue. 
0.600    
6. What emotional effect do 
important decisions have on 
you once they are taken? 
 0.857   
7. I am motivated by 
imagining the successful 
decisions positive results of 
entrepreneurial tasks. 
 
 
0.851   
8. Do you consider that 
degree of uncertainty is  the 
business environment is 
 0.842   
9. I know how to most control 
my emotions. 
  0.774  
10. For how long do you 
reckon to keep your position 
in 
your firm? 
  0.715  
11. How confident are you in 
your ability to take 
good financial decisions? 
  0.641  
12. How easily do you adapt 
yourself to deterioration of 
your financial situation? 
   0.862 
13. your reaction regarding  
changes in your firm 
environment is: 
   0.862 
14. in a job search would you 
rather seek: 
   0.789 
 
2.2.4. Control variables   
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Several researches have suggested a significant association between the board of director’s efficiency, 
leverage ratios (LEV) and firm size (LNSIZE) (Ball and Foster, 1982; Dechow and al, 1996 and Klein, 
2002).  Hence, both leverage ratios and firm size have been included as control variables in the present 
study.  
 
2.2.4.1. Leverage ratios or financial distress costs 
Financial distress can be defined as «the situation in which firms anticipated cash flow of can not cover its 
debts» (Leland, 1998). 
 
However, financial distress could engender costs that may have negative impact on the company value, 
such as the cost of failure (loss of brand image and competitiveness for the company).  
Actually, it is due to this reasons the agency theory considers debt as a means to discipline the officer and, 
subsequently, facilitates the task of governance mechanisms. So, the higher the debt ratio is, the higher the 
cost of financial distress is and the more the partners are involved in controlling their leaders. In fact, the 
leverage ratio is going to be essentially retained as a measure of this variable. Leverage (LEV) is defined as 
the ratio of total debts to total debts plus total assets.    
2.2.4.2. Firms size 
As noted by Ball and Foster (1982), the size has been applied to represent a large number of amounts and 
quantities such as the firm’s competitive advantage and the management team capacity (Becker and al, 
1998). So the size can be conceded as an indicator of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Hence, 
the size has been introduced as control variable in this research. 
Indeed, most studies have applied total assets or turnover as a measure for firm size (Bujadi and Richardson, 
1997). In this paper, it is measured through the log of the firm’s total assets (LNSIZE). 
For simplification purposes, the summary of each variable extent range in the model, its name as well as its 
expected impact on the effectiveness of the board are depicted in the following table: 
 
Table 6 
Variables descriptions 
Class : Phenomena : Measure : Variables : Predictions : 
Endogens variables  :  
Board of directors  
Board implication in the 
decision   
Number of its members BSIZE 
The presence of 
independent members in 
the board  
 
Number of outside directors 
/total board members. 
 
BIND 
 
CEO is also the  board’s  
chair 
1 if the CEO is also the 
board’s chair and 0 
DUAL 
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otherwise. 
Exogenous variables : 
Emotional 
intelligence   
Perception and 
administration emotions 
Score obtained by 33 items 
from Schutte and  al     
1998 
IE + 
Lost aversion 
 
Loss rumination and 
reputation  
The questionnaire obtained 
score   
LAV - 
Optimism  
Directors overestimate 
capacity of their  firms  
The questionnaire obtained 
score   
OP - 
overconfidence 
Directors overestimate 
their  personal 
competences  
The questionnaire obtained 
score   
OVER - 
Cognitive 
flexibility  
Reaction to a new 
information 
 
The questionnaire obtained 
score   
CF + 
Controls variables  
Leverage ratios CEO controlled  
Leverage ratios 
= total debts /(total debts 
+total assets) 
LEV + 
Firms size 
Firms signaled 
performance  
Ln (total assets) LNSIZE + 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Empirical model 
 
Y = α + α
1 
IE + α
2 
LAV + α
3 
OP + α
4 
OVER + α
5 
CF + α
6
 LEV + α
7 
LNSIZE + ξ 
Where: 
Y: the board of directors’ efficiency. 
IE: measure index of emotional intelligence. 
LAV: the score of loss aversion. 
OP: the score of optimism. 
OVER:  the score of overconfidence. 
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CF:  the score of cognitive flexibility.  
LEV: Leverage ratio.  
LNSIZE: firm’s size. 
Ξ : the error. 
  
Table 7 presents variables descriptive statistics of our model. Bangladeshi companies are characterized by 
an average debt level, a medium size, and presence of behavioral biases, an acceptable level of emotional 
intelligence and an independent director’s board. 
 
Table 7 
Summary Statistics 
variable Mean std Min Max N 
board size (BSIZE) 7.60 2.56 4 12 60 
Board independence (BIND)  0.40 0.20 0.1 0.8 60 
CEO duality (DUAL) 0.26 0.44 0 1 60 
Emotional intelligence (IE) 50.50 19.86 18 90 60 
Loss aversion (LAV) 10.56 4.73 4 20 60 
Optimism (OP) 11.64 4.27 4 20 60 
Overconfidence (OVER) 9.49 3.806 3 15 60 
Cognitive flexibility (CF) 8.91 3.92 3 15 60 
Leverage ratios (LEV) 0.50 0.27 0,1 1 60 
Firms size (LNSIZE) 9.04 3.35 2.85 15.4 60 
3. Empirical results 
This paper examines the relationship between the board characteristics and emotional intelligence. I will 
use three models to examine this relation: every model treats the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and one of efficiency criteria of the board. Later, I will describe different tests which are 
realized.   
 
3.1. Board efficiency and size 
 
3.1.1. The model would be as follows 
BSIZE= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV + α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE+ ξ 
BSIZE: the board size explains and indicates the board’s implication in the decision making. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical tests 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the linear regression method has been applied: the objective behind 
this model is to describe the relationship between the board’s implication in decision making and emotional 
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variables (IE and Emotional bias).   
 
3.1.3. Results 
The results depicted in table 8, show that corporate psychological characteristics explain a 46.6 % of the 
board’s implication in decision making (R
2 
=46, 6%). These results are actually sustain our four advanced 
hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, the firm size and leverage ratio appear to have a significant 
and negative relationship with the board’s size. 
 
Table 8 also, indicates a significant and negative relationship between emotional intelligence and the 
board’s size (β= -0,485; p=0,000). This result is due to the fact that every director enjoying high level of 
emotional intelligence tends to overlook and neglect other directors with different ideologies.  
Besides, the model demonstrates a non-significant and negative relationship between loss aversion and the 
board’s size (β= -0,070; p=0,564).  This result can be explained by the firms’ high level of emotional 
intelligence (the high level of emotional intelligence minimize the presence of cognitive bias in the firms’ 
decisions). 
 
As for the regression, it suggests a non-significant and positive relation between optimism and the board’s 
size (β=0,034; p=0,380). This positive relationship is due to the directors’ optimism, as they tend to 
overestimate the CEO’s qualifications and would accept all the decisions they make for instance in case of 
adding new directors.   
 
Moreover, the result has shown a significant and negative relationship between overconfidence and the 
board’s size (β= -0,228; p=0,038). In fact, the following explanations could be part forward: first, 
overconfidence appears to be negative attitude influencing the individual’s evaluative capacity. Indeed, 
overconfident directors tend to overestimate her personal capacity and, consequently, would refuse to add 
new directors to the board. 
 
Regression also presents, an insignificant and positive relationship between cognitive flexibility and the 
board’s size (β=0,191; p=0,533). This may be explained by the fact that a director who enjoys a great deal 
of cognitive flexibility would alway prefer modification and seek to enhance a challenging decision. He 
could tend to be either indifferent or agree to add new directors.  
 
Table 8 
Board size results 
Variables  Bêta Significance expected relationship Reached relationship 
Constant 20,865 0 ,000  
 
IE -0,485 0,000*** - - 
LAV -0,070 0,564 + - 
OP 0,034 0,380 + + 
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OVER -0,228 0,038** + - 
CF 0,191 0,533 - + 
LEV -0,326 0,004*** - - 
LNSIZE -0,226 0,042** - - 
Cox and Snell  ratios R2 0,466 
**, ***, signifiance at 5% and  1%. 
3.2. Board efficiency and independence members  
3.2.1. The model  
BIND= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV + α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE + ξ 
BIND: presence of independent members in the board of directors. 
3.2.2. Empirical tests 
 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the linear regression method has been applied: this model’s objective is 
to describe the nature of relationship between the board’s independence and emotional variables (IE and 
Emotional bias).   
 
3.2.3. Results 
The results appearing on table 9, show that corporate psychological characteristics explain a 60.8 % 
proportion of the board’s independence (R
2 
= 60.8%). These results are, actually, consolidate four proposed 
hypotheses. In terms of the control variables, it has been discovered that the firm’s size and leverage ratio 
have a significant and positive relationship with the board’s independence. 
 
Results have show a significant and positive relationship between the board’s independence and emotional 
intelligence (β= 0,364; p=0,000). This result can be explained by the argument that the firms’ partners who 
have had a high level of emotional intelligence are conscious about risk collusion between the CEO and 
directors. Owing to this fact, they are found under the obligation to choose independent directors to 
represent them in the board. This interrelatedness shows the positive role emotional intelligence plays in the 
board’s efficiency.   
Concerning regression, it presents an insignificant and negative relationship between loss aversion and the 
board’s independence (β= -0,009; p=0,943). This type of association could be justified by the loss aversion 
among the firms’ partners as it is the case, for instance, when partners refuse to add a new outsider director 
as this might generate the desperation of managerial rent linked to modification in the board composition.    
 
Moreover, the model presents an insignificant and positive relationship between optimism and the board’s 
independence (β= 0,037; p=0,719). This result might be explained by the investors’ optimism: investors so 
optimistic about the firm’s performance are encouraged to invest in this firm; hence the number of outsider- 
directors in the board is likely to increase.  
Table 9 shows a non significant and positive relationship between overconfidence and the board’s 
independence (β= 0,037; p=0,719).  This could be explained by the CEO’s overconfidence: this bias 
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would generate some unconsciousness regarding the likely outcomes of introducing a new outsider- 
director in the discretionary space.  
 
As regards cognitive flexibility, it presents a significant and positive relationship with the board’s 
independence (β= 0,175; p=0,126). Actually this can be explained by the board’s cognitive role. This role 
might allow them to instance a new outsider- director highly qualified in emotional intelligence. 
 
Table 9 
The board’s independence results 
variables Bêta Significance expected relationship Reached relationship 
Constant -0,348 0 ,005  
 
IE 0,364 0,000*** + + 
LAV -0,009 0,943 - - 
OP 0,037 0,719 - + 
OVER -0,014 0,881 - + 
CF 0,175 0,126 + + 
LEV 0,442 0,000*** + + 
LNSIZE 0,311 0,001*** + + 
Cox and Snell  ratios R2 0,608 
***, significance at 1%. 
3.3. Board efficiency and CEO dual functions 
3.3.1. Model presentation 
DUAL= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV+ α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE + ξ 
DUAL: the CEO is also the board’s chair, it takes 1if the CEO is also the board’s chair and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2. Empirical tests 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the logistic binary regression method has been applied: the objective 
behind using this model lies in describing the relationship between the CEO’s duality and emotional 
variables (emotional intelligence and Emotional bias).   
 
3.3.3. Results 
The results appearing in have table 10 shown that corporate psychological characteristics depict some a 
30.4 % of the CEO’s duality (R
2 
= 30.4%). Actually these results are supportive of our four advanced 
hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, one could discover that the firm’s size has a significant and 
positive relationship with the CEO’s duality. 
 
The results also highlight a significant and negative relationship between emotional intelligence and the 
CEO’s duality (β= -0,121; p=0,018). This can be justified by the firm partners’ high level of emotional 
intelligence: this competence allows them a better evaluation of the CEO’s competence along with the firm 
performance. In this way, the CEO duality is minimized. 
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Moreover, regression shows a non significant and negative relationship between loss aversion and CEO 
duality (β= -0,084; p=0,509). This has an explanation in the fact that when the shareholders are exposed to 
risk aversion, they tend to refuse all the CEO’s decisions that favour his discretion mainly his dual 
functions. 
 
As regards optimism, it presents a significant and positive relationship with the CEO’s duality (β= 0,508; 
p=0, 015). The optimistic shareholders appear to accept all the CEO’s decisions affecting the efficiency of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Added to this, table 8 shows a significant and negative relationship between overconfidence and CEO 
duality of function (β=- 0,338; p=0, 062).  This result is justified by the fact that an overconfident CEO 
has a tendency to overestimate his capacity and personal competence. These biases inhibit him from being a 
board’s chair.    
 
Eventually, this model alludes to a non-significant and positive relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and the CEO duality (β= 0,172; p=0, 404). This result due to the fact that the CEO’s high level of cognitive 
flexibility can improve and broaden his discretionary space due to his standing as a board’s chair. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
CEO duality results 
Variables Bêta Significance expected relationship Reached relationship 
Constant 2,318 0 ,562  
 
IE -0,121    0,018*** - - 
LAV -0,084         0,509 + - 
OP 0,508 0,015*** + + 
OVER -0,338 0,062* + - 
CF 0,172 0,404 - + 
LEV -0,013 0,994 - - 
LNSIZE 0,290 0,053** - + 
Cox and Snell  ratios R2 0,304 
Model Χ2 21,779    p-value=0.003*** 
N 60 
*, **, *** respectively significance at 10%, 5% et 1 
4. DISCUSSION  
It is worth noting that most of the previous analyses have predominantly suggested that the leaders’ 
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emotional characteristics have had a significantly noticeable impact on the directors’ board efficiency. One 
might well, ask, however: are these emotional characteristics (whether emotional intelligence or emotional 
bias) the maser are primary determinants of the directors’ board efficiency? 
 
Actually, the multiple regressions depicted this study have examines the relationship governing and binding 
the leaders’ emotional characteristics and the board of directors’ composition and efficiency. Indeed, the 
results depicted in table 6 have shown that firms’ corporate psychological characteristics explain a 46.6 % 
proportion of the board’s implication in the decision making strategies (R
2 
=46, 6%). These results are 
actually corroborative of our set hypotheses: the high level of emotional intelligence enables to minimize 
the behavioural biases (i.e. the loss aversion bias), and achieve an effective control thereof. 
 
Regarding the results appearing on table 7, they have shown that firms’ corporate psychological 
characteristics explain a 60.8 % ratio of the board’s independence (R
2 
= 60.8%). These results are 
supportive of the set hypotheses. In fact, emotional intelligence allows every individual to develop 
emotional consciousness, which in turn helps him react appropriately to different situations. It would 
actually help the manager to realize himself better and preserve his motivation to accomplish his shrews 
and task, among which control of the directing team. 
As for the results predicted in table 8, they have demonstrated that corporate psychological characteristics 
proportionately explain a 30.4 % fate of the CEO’s duality (R
2 
= 30.4%). These results do actually 
consolidate our assumed hypotheses. Indeed, emotions or emotional intelligence particularly guide the 
individual towards rationality. Data have suggested that the individuals enjoying a high level of emotional 
intelligence would be more aware of the factors affecting and influencing their positive and negative 
emotions. The awareness and understanding of these emotion-triggering factors would allow managers to 
choose the appropriate measures, take the convenient step and improve the board of directors’ efficiency as 
a governance means and mechanism. 
 
Finally, the empirical analysis of the relationship governing and binding emotional intelligence and the 
board of directors (board size, it members’ independence or presence of external directors’ and 
multifunctionality) has highlighted a positive impact of the Bangladeshi managers’ emotional intelligence 
on the effectiveness of control through this mechanism. It also affirms the complementary relationship 
between emotional intelligence and the directors’ board. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the present work is 
restrained by certain limitations, namely: 
 
 Firstly, some psychological aspects of theoretical nature could not be wholly approached in a 
complete empirical way. This limit is due, on the one hand, to the nature of the data sought, which may be 
perceived as being personal, or even secret as for as  the contracted leaders are concerned. On the other 
hand, it is due to the applied research tool which has not enables to achieve all the intended desired data. As 
a matter of fact the questionnaire turns out to be non-flexible means of data collection. In our case, we have 
realized that certain questions or items (especially those measuring over-confidence managers’) should 
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have been modified or added so that more accurate data could be reached and the theoretically-studied 
variables to be more operational. 
 
 The researcher’s representations regarding the studied variables (defined in terms of responses to the 
questionnaire), constitute a limit in so far as they are dealt with the throughout the various choices made all 
over the research; actually they do leave some trails of subjectivity. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the impact of emotional intelligence on the directors’ board efficiency. 
Noteworthy, the aimed targeted behind this work has been devise an attempt has long prevailed over 
behavioural whereby to elaborately a predominant research gap that governance by implementing a survey 
conducted around some executives of large private companies in Bangladesh. Actually, the collected data 
analysis has shown the importance of emotional intelligence as a prerequisite key skill or competence, 
(which may improve the controllers’ perception and evaluation of alternatives), in improving the control 
quality. Indeed, the empirical analysis of the emotional intelligence relationship with the board of directors 
(namely, regarding such factors as board size, presence of external executives and multifunction holding) 
has led to depict a positive impact of the Bangladeshi managers’ on the effectiveness of control via this 
mechanism. In addition, it has highlighted the complementary relationship between emotional intelligence 
and the board of directors. Nevertheless, the negative relationship between emotional intelligence and the 
behavioural biases reunions still not thoroughly evaluated none verified and has to be fact her checked. 
Given its numerous diverse personal, social and professional advantages, effects and benefits emotional 
intelligence turns out to be a worth developing skill that needs to be even deeply explored and further 
thoroughly promoted. 
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